Myth puts into play a form of logic, a logic in contrast to the logic of non-contradiction of the philosophers, a logic of ambiguity, equivocalness, and polarity, a logic other than the logic of the logos
this other logic belongs to a third genre or kind...it does not name...it is a stranger to the order of the paradigm...it is without sensible (perceptible) form
Χώρα does not submit itself to the same law that it places or situates
the discourse on the khôra is also a discourse on the kind (genre) and on different kinds of genre
the khôra does not adapt itself to the distinction between the sensible (perceptible) and the intelligible
the khôra does not lend itself easily to placing, assigning a place: it is more situating than situated or placed
the khôra has no essence but it does have a structure--the khôra is the anachronism of being
khôra is not a subject, not the subject
we cannot even say the khôra for that would give it a signification, which it doesn't have; the article 'the' presupposes the existence of a thing
khôra designates none of the known types of being; it is neither perceptible or intelligible
khôra gives nothing in giving place (it doesn't 'take place')
khôra is "something," which isn't a thing, that puts into cause the distinction word/concept, word-concept/thing, sense/reference, signification/value, name/nameable
khôra must not receive for her, she then must not receive, only lets be lent the properties (of what) she receives (p. 34)
We have to speak of her, not so much by always giving her the same name, but speaking of her in the same way (p. 34). Is this in a singularly idiomatic way or in the regulated generality of a scheme?
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